出刊年月/Date of Publishing

1992.03

所屬卷期/Vol. & No.   第22卷第1期 Vol. 22, No. 1

類型/Type                 研究論文 Research Article

篇名/Title
道德權利與道德錯誤
On Waldron’s Conception of Moral Rights

作者/Author
戴華 Terence Tai

頁碼/Pagination
pp. 1-42

摘要
已故的二十世紀英國哲學家麥基 (J. L. Mackie) 在其1978年發表的論文中曾指出，唯有我們不需因沒去從事某事而背負道德責任的狀況下，我們才會有去從事某事的道德權利。根據麥基有關道德權利的說法，唯有當某項行為不是道德上錯誤的行為，我們才可能擁有從事該項行為的道德權利。而當代美國政治哲學家華爾臣 (Jeremy Waldron) 在1981年發表的〈犯錯的權利〉一文中反對麥基對道德權利的看法。華爾臣認為，一個人可擁有道德權利去做一件從道德觀點看來算是錯誤的事情。唯有產生如此可能時，我們才能獲得自由派學者所主張的自主權並樂於接受生命中所做出的重大決定。

華爾臣認為當代自由派學者德沃金 (Ronald Dworkin) 的「權利為王牌」主張為他的理論開拓了更多討論的空間。本論文的前半部將分析德沃金的理論並試圖指出，為維持他的理論前後一致性德沃金最好認肯麥基的論述而否認華爾臣對他的詮釋。論文第二部份則嘗試以麥基的論述反駁華爾臣的主張，並區分兩種理解「自主性」的方式，一為必須以道德原則為考量的自主性，另一為超越道德藩籬的自主性。但在華爾臣論述中，他所提出的另類道德權利選項事實上談的是後者，因為他主張個人應被賦予道德權利，並在不失其超越道德的自主性的情況下，從事一些對自己人格之形成關係重大的抉擇。本論文主旨即在於反駁華爾臣的此項主張，因為他超越道德的自主性說法不能被視為一項應受維護的道德權利。

Abstract
J. L. Mackie (1978) once pointed out that we have a moral right to do something only if we have no moral duty not to do it. This view implies that the only moral rights we can claim to have are rights to do what is not morally wrong. Jeremy Waldron (1981) argues against such a conception of moral rights in a paper called “A Right to Do Wrong.” According to him, a correct conception of moral rights should allow for the possibility that we may have a moral right to do something that is morally wrong. He thinks that only if there is such a possibility can we be said to be really in possession of the kind of autonomy that liberals think we should enjoy when making important choices in our lives.

In Waldron’s view, the contemporary liberal Ronald Dworkin’s theory of “rights as trumps” has left such a possibility open. The first half of this paper examines Dworkin’s theory and seeks to show that, in order to be consistent, Dworkin had better opt for Mackie’s rather than Waldron’s conception of moral rights. The second half of this paper tries to defend Mackie’s conception against Waldron’s. Two kinds of autonomy are distinguished, namely, “autonomy” which is bound by the requirements of morality and “autonomy” which transcends them. In his argument for an alternative conception of moral rights, Waldron is in fact speaking of the second kind of “autonomy.” For him, the possibility of there being moral rights to do what is morally wrong must be acknowledged if “autonomy” in making important choices in our lives is to be protected as an ideal by moral rights. This paper tries to nullify the force of this claim by arguing that “autonomy” as conceived by Waldron in the second way is not a right kind of ideal to be protected by moral rights.

關鍵字/Key Word
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DOI
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學門分類/Subject
哲學 Philosophy