出刊年月/Date of Publishing

1994.03

所屬卷期/Vol. & No.   第24卷第1期 Vol. 24, No. 1

類型/Type                 研究論文 Research Article

篇名/Title
Ethics Without Principles
不涉及原則之倫理學

作者/Author
羅逖 Richard Rorty

頁碼/Pagination
pp. 1-19

摘要
傳統上道德和明智的區別築基於無條件 (或絕對) 義務和有條件 (或假設) 義務的對比。杜威則建議我們藉由慣例與非慣例社會關係中的差異，來重建道德和明智之間的區別。但是杜威的意見勢非康德所能接受，對康德而言，道德源自某特定人類機能——「理性」。康德視道德爲普遍不變的、非相對的、以及本質的。

從杜威和安奈．貝爾的觀點來看，我們的道德並不包含基本普遍的眞理，而是和團體意識有關——如何利用團體來界定自我，以及視何人爲團體的一員。個人的道德發展和群體的道德提升都是爲了重塑人類自我，以擴展人類構成關係之多樣性。

杜威派的實用主義者將道德的提升解釋爲同情心的擴展，並認爲此同情心的擴展較可能來自人的想像力，而非康德所謂的「理性」。

Abstract
Traditionally, the distinction between morality and prudence is traditionally drawn by contrasting unconditional and categorical obligations with conditional and hypothetical ones. While Dewey suggests we reconstruct the distinction between prudence and morality in terms of the distinction between conventional and non-conventional social relationships, his suggestion is not accepted by Kantians. According to Kant, morality is a special function of mankind’s “reason.” Kant viewed morality as universal, unconditional and intrinsic. Dewey and Annette Baier state in their work that morality doesn’t include basic universal truth and is instead related to group consciousness, such as making use of the group to define oneself and being seen as a member of that group. The development of individual morality and the promotion of group morality are for the purpose of re-inventing the human self and broadening the diversity of human relationships. Pragmatists of the Dewey school consider that morality is a matter of sentiment and that moral progress comes from an increase in Human imaginative power, not from Kant’s so-called “reason.”

關鍵字/Key Word
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DOI
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學門分類/Subject
哲學 Philosophy