出刊年月/Date of Publishing

1995.09

所屬卷期/Vol. & No.   第25卷第3期 Vol. 25, No. 3

類型/Type                 研究論文 Research Article

篇名/Title
原初意向性與錯誤表徵
Original Intentionality, and Misrepresentation

作者/Author
彭孟堯 Eric M. Peng

頁碼/Pagination
pp. 25-43

摘要
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Abstract
The ability of a cognitive system to misrepresent presupposes that the intentionality the system exhibits is original or intrinsic rather than derivative. This is true especially when we are talking about human intentionality, because, on the naturalistic representationalism proposed separately by Dretske, Fordor, and Papineau, the fixation of representational content is prior to what counts as a case of misrepresentation and has to be done in a non-derivative way.

Dennett, however, rejects the claim that human intentionality is original or intrinsic via his, as I call them, “Argument From Functional Re-ascription” and “Argument From Selfish Genes.” He argues that human intentionality is derivative either because of the possibility of re-ascribing functions to human intentionality is derivative either because of the possibility of re-ascribing functions to human cognitive systems or because of the reason that human beings derive their intentionality from the intentionality of our selfish genes. He thus argues that what are taken to be cases of misrepresentation night be dismissed and become cases of veridical representation.

This essay first presents what human original intentionlaity is by a brief survey of Searle’s and Dretske’s theories, since Dennett takes their views as his main target. His two arguments are then examined. With regard to the Argument From Functional Reascription, I argue that we stick to the survival principle (natural teleology) which is a major factor in the fixation of representational content in the naturalistic representationalism, even if we come to cases in which functional ascriptions are teleologically equivalent. With regard to the Argument From Selfish Genes, I examine three possible defences for the view that genes have intentionality from which human intentionality is derivable. I argue that none of the three defences work. I thus reject Dennett and defend the view that human intentionality is original or intrinsic and that the way the naturalistic representationalism explains misrepresentation is not affected.

關鍵字/Key Word
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DOI
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學門分類/Subject
哲學 Philosophy