出刊年月/Date of Publishing

1996.12

所屬卷期/Vol. & No.   第26卷第4期 Vol. 26, No. 4

類型/Type                 研究論文 Research Article

篇名/Title
國際勞動與資本移動之選擇
Choice between International Labor and Capital Mobilities

作者/Author
陳彥煌 Yen-huang Chen

頁碼/Pagination
pp. 71-98

摘要
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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to reexamine Ramaswami proposition (1968) within the framework of Stackelberg game in which capital-abundant (the leader) country and labor-abundant (the follower) country simultaneously impose specific taxes on factors of production moving across countries. Ramaswami argues that the active capital-abundant country prefers optimally importing foreign labor to optimally exporting her abundant capital. This paper provides conditions for countries to choose between capital mobility and repatriation policy (labor mobility). It indicates that Ramaswami proposition may not necessarily hold when the follower is allowed to impose tax on factors in response to the leader’s strategy. Furthermore, factor flows and welfare under Nash, Stackelberg and Ramaswami (monopoly or monopsony) equilibria are systematically compared by means of the apparatus of iso­ national-income curve. It also shows that a tax ceiling set around the neighborhood of Stackelberg equilibrium provides a mechanism for countries to improve their welfare.

關鍵字/Key Word
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DOI
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學門分類/Subject
經濟學 Economics