出刊年月/Date of Publishing

1998.09

所屬卷期/Vol. & No.   第28卷第3期 Vol. 28, No. 3

類型/Type                 研究論文 Research Article

篇名/Title
Naturalism in Epistemology
知識論的自然主義進路

作者/Author
費特曼 Richard Feldman

頁碼/Pagination
pp. 1-39

摘要
最近知識論方面的討論中對知識論本身的性質產生重大的歧見。贊成「自然化知識論」者認為知識論必須依賴認知科學的經驗成果。我則主張某些知識論的工作，例如致力於增進人類的理性思考，無疑地需要經驗科學的投入，但是自然主義者並未提供充份理由來證實經驗成果在核心的知識論工作中——亦即建構知識與證成的普遍抽象分析 扮演著舉足輕重的角色。經驗科學提出許多有關知覺、驗證、記憶等知識與證成來源之特定原則，但這些原則若不是對抽象普遍分析之個案做說明，便是單純地處理經驗的課題。最後，對懷疑論的回應是否需要科學之助，完全視該回應的本質而定。因此，傳統知識論中仍然有相當大的部份不仰賴科學。

Abstract
Recent work in epistemology reveals deep divisions over the very nature of the field. Advocates of naturalized epistemology hold that epistemology is crucially dependent upon empirical results from the cognitive sciences. I argue that some epistemology projects, such as the effort to help people to reason better, undoubtedly do require empirical input. In spite of the naturalists' arguments to the contrary, there's no good reason to think that empirical results will play any significant role in the central epistemological project, constructing a general abstract analysis of knowledge and justification. The formulation of specific principles about perception, testimony, memory and other potential sources of knowledge and justification either amounts to specifying mere special cases of the abstract general analyses or else is a purely empirical matter. Finally, whether responses to skepticism require input from science depends entirely upon the nature of the response. Thus, a large part of traditional epistemology remains independent of science.

關鍵字/Key Word
知識論、自然化知識論、自然主義、證成
epistemology, naturalized epistemology, naturalism, justification

DOI
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學門分類/Subject
哲學 Philosophy