出刊年月/Date of Publishing

1999.12

所屬卷期/Vol. & No.   第29卷第4期 Vol. 29, No. 4

類型/Type                 研究論文 Research Article

篇名/Title
先驗認知的神秘性與心理表徵理論的困境
The Mystery of A Priori Knowability and the Predicament of Theories of Mental Representation

作者/Author
彭孟堯 Eric M. Peng

頁碼/Pagination
pp. 81-118

摘要
本文旨在探討如何理解先驗認知的現象以及當代心理表徵理論能否予以適當的理論解釋，特別是針對「任何東西不可能同時既紅又藍」這種具有模態性的命題在知識論以及認知科學中要如何處理。我首先主張不要從知識對象的類型來瞭解「先驗／後驗」的區分，而是從認知的方式來瞭解：後驗認知就是非先驗的認知方式，而先驗認知則以「經驗對稱性」來理解。我進而論證當代認知科學無法為先驗認知現象提供理論解釋。而邦究爾雖企圖以「立即理性洞見」以及一套基於阿逵那斯的形上學所建立的心理內容理論，來理解先驗認知或理證。但我論證他的作法只是將問題轉移到阿逵那斯形上學中對於「意向存在」與「自然存在」的區分而已， 並沒有解消先驗認知的神秘性。

Abstract
This essay discusses (1) how the phenomena of a priori knowledge or justification are to be understood; and, (2) whether and how theories of mental representation might provide a satisfactory explanation for such phenomena. The paradigm example is the proposition that nothing can be both red all over and blue all over—a proposition involving modality. I first propose that a posteriori is non-a priori, and that a priori ways of knowing/justifying are ways that are symmetric to all experiences.

I then argue that no satisfactory explanations of a priori cognition are given by contemporary cognitive science. Further, though BonJour attempts to understand a priori knowing in terms of “immediate rational insight,” his theory is supplemented with Aquina’s metaphysics concerning how to fix mental content. I argue that his solution is equally unsatisfactory, in that he merely shifts the mystery of a priori to the mystery of distinguishing esse naturale from esse intentionale.

關鍵字/Key Word
先驗知識、經驗對稱性、分析命題、理性洞見
a priori knowability, experiential symmetry, analytic proposition, rational insight

DOI
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學門分類/Subject
哲學 Philosophy