出刊年月/Date of Publishing

2000.09

所屬卷期/Vol. & No.   第30卷第3期 Vol. 30, No. 3

類型/Type                 研究論文 Research Article

篇名/Title
知識論悖理之解消
The Resolution of Epistemology’s Paradox

作者/Author
彭孟堯 Eric M. Peng

頁碼/Pagination
pp. 1-39

摘要
黑樂林頓論證所有的知識論思維都會產生他所謂的「知識論悖理」，而陷入悖謬、不可能的窘境。這是由於任何知識論思維都必定預設「知識論上的區隔」以及「知識論上的自我優先性」，而這兩預設卻是互不相容的。我在本文論證他的知識論悖理不必被解決，而可被解消。我指出黑樂林頓的論證一方面有雅爾斯東所謂層次混淆的問題，一方面又將這種後設知識論的問題與實質知識論中有關複知原則的問題相混淆。由於他的論證有這兩種混淆，因此我們可以解消他的知識論悖理。

Abstract
Hetherington argues that each and every epistemological thought will inevitably lead to what he calls “Epistemology’s Paradox,” and therefore that no epistemology is possible. This is because every epistemological thought, he argues, necessarily has two mutually incompatible presuppositions: the Presupposition of Epistemological Distinctness and the Presupposition of Epistemological Preoccupation. I argue, however, that Hetherington is wrong about the two presuppositions. The mistakes stem from both his confusion of the vindication of epistemological thinking with the Knowledge-Knowledge Principle (or Chisholm’s Objectivity Principle) and from his confusion about Alston’s two levels of epistemic justification. I conclude, thus, that Epistemology’s Paradox can be resolved.

關鍵字/Key Word
知識論悖理、層次混淆、複知原則、後設知識論
epistemology’s paradox, level confusion, knowledge-knowledge principle, metaepistemology

DOI
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學門分類/Subject
哲學 Philosophy