出刊年月/Date of Publishing

2001.03

所屬卷期/Vol. & No.   第31卷第1期 Vol. 31, No. 1

類型/Type                 研究論文 Research Article

篇名/Title
Propositions and Relative Apriority
命題與相對先驗性

作者/Author
王啟義 Kai-Yee Wong

頁碼/Pagination
pp. 1-34

摘要
美國當代著名哲學家克里普克 (Saul Kripke) 的名著《命名與必然性》引發了很多關於形上學、語言哲學和邏輯哲學的論諍，對英美分析哲學界於有關領域的研究影響深遠；其中《命名與必然性》裡有關後驗必然真理的觀點所帶出的論諍，迄今仍備受討論。本文旨在指出疏解此論諍的關鍵之乃在明瞭「先驗性」與「命題」兩者在理論上之相互關係，並透過對撒文 (Nathan Salmon) 於有關問題的觀點來闡明此論旨。撒文乃發揚克里普克所代表的「直接指涉論」的著名理論家，然而在近年一系列著作中，卻以其「單稱命題」的理論出發，否定了克里普克對後驗必然真理的觀點。撒文的論証要成立，他必須堅持其對「先驗性」的絕對觀；本文則指出，撒文的絕對觀是難以跟其命題理論溶合一致的。此外，作者亦希望藉本文的討論，闡明「命題」一概念與直接指涉論的核心觀念之關連。

Abstract
This paper is intended as a contribution to the debate concerning the interplay between two important notions in philosophical logic: the proposition and the a priori. It is argued that a full appreciation of the interplay between these two notions is the key to an adequate assessment of one of the most hotly debated issues to have emerged from Saul Kripke’s classic lectures “Naming and Necessity”－the issue of necessary a posteriori truths. Through a critical analysis of a recent suggestion by Nathan Salmon that apriority in the traditional absolute sense is still the basic notion of apriority in the way-of-taking-relative framework motivated by the theory of singular propositions, it is shown that whether propositions are direct objects of the application of “a priori” depends on one’s conception of propositions.

關鍵字/Key Word
指涉理論、命題、先驗、後驗必然性、克里普克
theory of reference, proposition, a priori, the necessary a posteriori, Saul Kripke

DOI
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學門分類/Subject
哲學 Philosophy