出刊年月/Date of Publishing
2002.03
所屬卷期/Vol. & No. 第32卷第1期 Vol. 32, No. 1
類型/Type 研究論文 Research Article
出刊年月/Date of Publishing
2002.03
所屬卷期/Vol. & No. 第32卷第1期 Vol. 32, No. 1
類型/Type 研究論文 Research Article
篇名/Title
為甚麼我應該合乎道德?——康德的定言令式之意義
Why Should I be Moral?—Kant’s Categorical Imperative
作者/Author
陳瑤華 Jau-Hwa Chen
頁碼/Pagination
pp. 155-186
摘要
康德以定言令式來理解道德的應然受到當代倫理學家,如安思孔、芙特和威廉斯等人的質疑。本文主要釐清芙特和威廉斯所質疑的部份,尤其是康德如何理解道德應然的意義。定言令式主要說明道德產生約束力的來源為何,並說明作為判準的道德法則,為甚麼具有規範行為的力量 (或正當性)。康德主張這種約束力的正當性,來自於道德法則的純粹概念。這樣的主張不但能回應「為甚麼我應該合乎道德?」的問題,而且能夠說明道德基本法則,並非以主觀的意欲和目的,為其正當性的依據和基礎。這並不代表道德的要求與社會文化的價值之建構完全無關,康德區別思考道德判斷的兩種不同層面之問題:道德判斷的依據與它的社會文化意義。
Abstract
Kant’s understanding of moral demand as categorical imperative was criticized by many modern practical philosophers for its formal and vague interpretation of morality. This paper, addressing the critique of Kant’s categorical imperative, which is initiated by G.M.E. Anscombe and carried out by P. Foot and B. Williams, tries to clarify why Kant formulates a categorical imperative for the conception of morality. For Kant, the justification of moral responsibility is grounded on nothing but the pure moral concept itself, which is not grounded again on other subjective interests and ends. The content of moral law may not be independent of its social context, but it does not mean that the latter justifies its validity. In making this argument, Kant distinguished the foundation of moral judgment from its social and cultural meaning.
關鍵字/Key Word
康德、定言令式、客觀理由、內在論、外在論、芙特、威廉斯
Kant, categorical imperative, objective reason, internalism, externalism, Philippa Foot, Bernard Williams
DOI
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學門分類/Subject
哲學 Philosophy