出刊年月/Date of Publishing

2005.06

所屬卷期/Vol. & No.   第35卷第2期 Vol. 35, No. 2

類型/Type                 研究論文 Research Article

篇名/Title
真理何為？——從哈伯瑪斯真理共識理論的實用轉向論真理的規範性涵義
What Should Truth Do?—On the Normative Implications of Truth in Reference to the Pragmatic Turn of Jürgen Habermas’ Consensus Theory of Truth

作者/Author
林遠澤 Yuan-Tse Lin

頁碼/Pagination
pp. 363-404

摘要
真理共識理論是哈伯瑪斯「溝通行動理論」的基礎。早期哈伯瑪斯把真理等同於合理的可主張性，結果陷入二律背反的困境。面對這個難題，哈伯瑪斯近來做了理論的轉向。他放棄真理共識理論的知識論解讀，重新尋找一種建基於生活實踐之實在論基礎的真理實用概念。以重新把他對於真理的語用學觀點，從做為程序性的知識論判準，轉向做為保障我們能從反思性的「討論」再度回到在生活實踐之「溝通行動」中的規範性要求。本文將以「真理何為？」為線索，說明如何能從哈伯瑪斯的實用轉向，得到對於真理概念之規範性涵義的新理解。

Abstract
In 1999 Habermas admitted that his consensus theory of truth fails as an effort to make the semantic concept of truth epistemological, because the identification of “truth” with “rational assertability” involves an antinomy. For either instances of rational assertability are fallible or they are infallible by virtue of their being made in an ideal speech situation. To avoid this antinomy Habermas claims that truth is not an epistemological concept but a normative one. Its function is not to produce what is infallible, rather, its function is to regulate speech acts. In the following essay I explain wherein Habermas’ pragmatic turn consists. In the process, the normative implications of the concept of truth are clarified.

關鍵字/Key Word
真理共識理論、實用轉向、哈伯瑪斯、語用學
consensus theory of truth, pragmatic turn, Habermas, pragmatics

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DOI
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學門分類/Subject
哲學 Philosophy