出刊年月/Date of Publishing
2006.06
所屬卷期/Vol. & No. 第36卷第2期 Vol. 36, No. 2
類型/Type 研究論文 Research Article
出刊年月/Date of Publishing
2006.06
所屬卷期/Vol. & No. 第36卷第2期 Vol. 36, No. 2
類型/Type 研究論文 Research Article
篇名/Title
Nozick and Indigenous Truth
諾錫克之本生真理論
作者/Author
王啟義 Kai-Yee Wong
頁碼/Pagination
pp. 203-227
摘要
美國哲學家克里普克提出有必然後驗真理之說, 引起了很大的爭論。一些哲學家應用二維模態語意論作分析架構,嘗試說明必然後驗真理之可能,不少論者都認為是處理有關問題的最佳進路。諾錫克近年提出的本生真理論,跟二維論的進路十分相近,但卻有相反的結論。二維模態論備受注視,但諾錫克之見解普遍為人所忽略。本文將討論二維論的進路所面對的一個嚴重困難,從而說明何以諾錫克跟二維論者有上述之分歧,並由此對二維論的進路作一深入的剖析和評價。
Abstract
Applying two-dimensional modal semantics, some philosophers, most recently Frank Jackson and David Chalmers among others, have sought to provide analyses of Kripke’s examples of the necessary a posteriori. Despite the massive amount of attention that two-dimensionalism has received of late, Robert Nozick’s recent accounting of Kripke’s examples, which bears striking similarities to these two-dimensionalist analyses but reached a different conclusion, has gone unnoticed. This paper argues that (a) underlying such a difference is a serious problem with the two- dimensionalist approach to the necessary a posteriori and (b) thinking through this problem will go a long way towards a proper understanding, and thus assessment, of this approach.
關鍵字/Key Word
二維語意學、索爾.克里普克、羅伯特.諾錫克
two-dimensional semantics, Saul Kripke, Robert Nozick
DOI
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學門分類/Subject
哲學 Philosophy