出刊年月/Date of Publishing

2008.06

所屬卷期/Vol. & No.   第38卷第2期 Vol. 38, No. 2

類型/Type                 研究論文 Research Article

篇名/Title
情緒認知判斷裡的情境性初探
The Situatedness of Evaluative Judgment in the Emotions—An Early Study

作者/Author
劉希文 Hsi-wen Daniel Liu

頁碼/Pagination
pp. 243-306

摘要
英美情緒哲學裡情緒認知論的一個重要主張者所羅門認為，情緒就是判斷，他所討論的判斷形式不一定是命題，並且讓情緒者與世界嚙合起來，本文基於情緒認知論的立場來探討情緒判斷的情境性。

本文一方面討論所羅門對評價性判斷之特性的看法，另一方面以格理夫與史卡藍提諾 (將出版) 來呈現情緒情境性的內涵，然後論述情緒判斷具有情境性，由此對格理夫與史卡藍提諾 (將出版) 所間接認為情緒認知論所論述的判斷不具情境性，加以反駁；這樣，同時也把情緒哲學的情緒認知論接軌到認知科學與心靈哲學的情緒情境性研究。

Abstract
Solomon, an important advocate of cognitivism in philosophy of emotions, maintains that emotions are judgments. Emotional judgments, according to Solomon, may be non-propositional; such judgments are likely to be episodic, procedural or even kinesthetic. Emotions, in consideration of their intentionality, may be seen as subjective engagements with the world. Thus, the emotions are put into various forms. This paper investigates those forms in view of their situatedness.

This paper discuss Solomon’s notion of evaluative judgment, on the one hand, and learn the notion of the situatedness concerning emotions from Griffiths & Scarantino (to appear), on the other. Griffiths and Scarantino suppose that the notion of situatedness does not have a position in cognitivism. This paper, however, argues that Griffiths & Scarantino’s notion of situatedness is posited in Solomon’s notion of evaluative judgment. This implies that the notion of situatedness can be blended into cognitivism. This paper, as a consequence, connects cognitivism in the philosophy of the emotions with situatedness research in cognitive science and the philosophy of mind.

關鍵字/Key Word
情緒哲學、情緒認知論、評價性判斷、情境性、所羅門
philosophy of emotions, cognitive theory of emotions, evaluative judgment, situatedness, Robert Solomon

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DOI
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學門分類/Subject
哲學 Philosophy