出刊年月/Date of Publishing
2010.09
所屬卷期/Vol. & No. 第40卷第3期 Vol. 40, No. 3
類型/Type 研究論文 Research Article
出刊年月/Date of Publishing
2010.09
所屬卷期/Vol. & No. 第40卷第3期 Vol. 40, No. 3
類型/Type 研究論文 Research Article
篇名/Title
The Prospects for Evolutionary Ethics Today
當今演化倫理學的前景
作者/Author
尼爾.李維 Neil Levy
頁碼/Pagination
pp. 529-571
摘要
解釋人類起源的演化論普遍受到抗拒的原因之一,在於不少人恐懼道德演化論可能摧毀道德的根基。這是由於人們懷疑,如果道德不過是立基演化之行為傾向,將使道德顯得虛幻不實。若干哲學家也認同這個觀點,並用道德的演化起源來攻擊道德實在論。倘若上述為真,那麼我們將面臨一個抉擇的困境,或以科學之名否決道德,或是否決目前最受證實的人類起源之科學解釋,以拯救道德。然而,如同本文呈現的,我們無需接受演化倫理學者的主張,因為道德正像我們所理解的一般,可與演化論相容並存。
Abstract
One reason for the widespread resistance to evolutionary accounts of the origins of humanity is the fear that they undermine morality: if morality is based on nothing more than evolved dispositions, it would be shown to be illusory, many people suspect. This view is shared by some philosophers who take their work on the evolutionary origins of morality to undermine moral realism. If they are right, we are faced with an unpalatable choice: to reject morality on scientific grounds, or to reject our best-confirmed scientific explanation of our origins in order to save morality. Fortunately, as I show, we have no reason to accept the deflationary claims of some evolutionary ethicists: morality, as we ordinarily understand it, is fully compatible with evolution.
關鍵字/Key Word
演化、倫理學、後設倫理學、史賓塞、赫胥黎
evolution, ethics, meta-ethics, Spencer, Huxley
DOI
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學門分類/Subject
哲學 Philosophy