出刊年月/Date of Publishing

2011.12

所屬卷期/Vol. & No.   第41卷第4期 Vol. 41, No. 4

類型/Type                 研究論文 Research Article

篇名/Title
詹姆士的實用主義「實在」觀
William James’s Pragmatic Notion of Reality

作者/Author
鄭喜恆 Hsi-Heng Cheng

頁碼/Pagination
pp. 977-1021

摘要
本文系統地詮釋了詹姆士《實用主義》第五、六、七講中有關「實在」的諸主張，整理出「觀念系統多元論」、「實在變動論」以及「人文主義『實在』觀」三大論點，統合命名為「詹姆士的實用主義『實在』觀」；本文並且指出，詹姆士是從知識論的角度，在他的「個人信念修改機制」與「三重實在」主張的架構下來詮釋與辯護這三個論點，而「三重實在」主張又建立在他的實用主義「實在」定義之上；本文最後考察了「對個人信念缺乏足夠的客觀約束」這個批評意見對於「個人信念修改機制」以及這三個論點所造成的衝擊。

Abstract
In this paper, it is shown that Lectures Five, Six, and Seven of William James’s Pragmatism contain the following three interesting, but puzzling and often misunderstood, theses on reality: conceptual scheme pluralism, the thesis of the mutation of reality, and a humanist view of reality. Taken together, I consider these “James’s pragmatic notion of reality.” It is argued that James can be better interpreted as explaining and defending these three theses from an epistemological perspective, within a framework based on both his holistic model of belief revision and his notion of “three-fold realities.” Finally, I investigate whether the objection that there are insufficient objective regulations on belief successfully challenges his model of belief revision and these three theses on reality.

關鍵字/Key Word
詹姆士、實用主義、實在、人文主義、多元論
William James, pragmatism, reality, humanism, pluralism

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DOI
https://doi.org/10.7015/JEAS.201112.0977

學門分類/Subject
哲學 Philosophy