出刊年月/Date of Publishing

2012.12

所屬卷期/Vol. & No.   第42卷第4期 Vol. 42, No. 4

類型/Type                 研究論文 Research Article

篇名/Title
意志、審慮與信念：詮釋詹姆士的〈信念意志〉
Will, Deliberation, and Belief—Interpreting William James’s “The Will to Believe”

作者/Author
鄭喜恆 Hsi-Heng Cheng

頁碼/Pagination
pp. 635-671

摘要
本文所詮釋與發展的是詹姆士的〈信念意志〉在「情感與意志等非知性因素在個人決定信念之過程中能夠扮演正面角色」這條核心思想路線上的主張。對於〈信念意志〉的流行詮釋指出，只有在特定條件得到滿足時，個人才有正當性使用非知性因素來決定信念。但是本文提出的新詮釋指出，雖然非知性因素無法證成信念，但是在個人信念決定過程的三個階段中 (決定審慮哪些議題、審慮之過程、以及審慮之結束) 可以有不同種類的非知性因素來扮演各自的正面角色，協助讓個人信念決定下來。這個新詮釋不僅可免除流行詮釋所面臨的質疑，而且進一步發展了〈信念意志〉中的許多核心洞見。

Abstract
This paper interprets and develops one of the main issues dealt with in William James’s “The Will to Believe”: the issue of what positive role non-intellectual factors such as passions and volitions play in an individual’s deliberative process of belief formation. A popular way of interpreting “The Will to Believe” holds the controversial view that individuals can legitimately use non-intellectual factors such as passions and volitions to determine their beliefs only when a certain set of conditions are satisfied. However, the interpretation offered in this paper, accepting that non-intellectual factors provide no epistemic justification for beliefs, contends that various kinds of non-intellectual factors can legitimately play distinctively positive roles in an individual’s deliberative process of belief formation and thus contribute to the settlement of belief. This new interpretation not only avoids many problems facing the above-mentioned popular interpretation, but also further develops some of the central insights in “The Will to Believe.”

關鍵字/Key Word
詹姆士、知識論、意志、信念、審慮
William James, epistemology, will, belief, deliberation

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DOI
https://doi.org/10.7015/JEAS.201212.0635

學門分類/Subject
哲學 Philosophy