出刊年月/Date of Publishing

2013.06

所屬卷期/Vol. & No.   第43卷第2期 Vol. 43, No. 2

類型/Type                 研究論文 Research Article

篇名/Title
《精神現象學》中的思辯命題
The Speculative Proposition in the Phenomenology of Spirit

作者/Author
劉創馥 Chong-Fuk Lau

頁碼/Pagination
pp. 415-453

摘要
本文分析黑格爾《精神現象學》序言中的思辯命題理論。黑格爾在不同著作反覆批評命題或判斷的形式，他認為主謂詞的結構不適合表達哲學真理。黑格爾在《精神現象學》的序言討論一種另類的動態命題觀，以同一命題代表，視之為主謂詞之間的往返運動。不少黑格爾學者認為，思辯命題就是這種另類的命題形式，專門用來表述黑格爾的思辯哲學。本文批評這種解釋，指出黑格爾並非要構作任何另類的命題形式，而是以一種獨特的手法運用命題，突顯命題形式的預設和限制，從而建立真理的整體論。

Abstract
This paper analyzes the theory of speculative proposition in the Preface to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Hegel repeatedly criticizes the form of proposition or judgment in his writings, maintaining that the subject-predicate structure is inadequate to express philosophical truth. In the Preface to his Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel discusses an alternative, dynamic conception of proposition, viewing the proposition of identity as a back-and-forth movement between subject and predicate. Many Hegel scholars believe that the speculative proposition is this alternative form of proposition, designed specifically for presenting Hegel’s speculative philosophy. This paper argues against this interpretation, showing that Hegel does not aim to construct any alternative form of proposition, but rather employs propositions in a peculiar way to reveal the presuppositions and limitations of the propositional form in order to establish his holism of truth.

關鍵字/Key Word
黑格爾、思辯命題、命題形式、《精神現象學》、《邏輯學》
Hegel, Speculative Proposition, Form of Proposition, Phenomenology of Spirit, Science of Logic

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DOI
https://doi.org/10.7015/JEAS.201306_43(2).0004

學門分類/Subject
哲學 Philosophy