出刊年月/Date of Publishing

2017.12

所屬卷期/Vol. & No.   第47卷第4期 Vol. 47, No. 4

類型/Type                 研究論文 Research Article

篇名/Title
裴爾士難題以及邏輯情操
Peirce’s Puzzle and Logical Sentiment

作者/Author
鄭喜恒 Hsi-Heng Cheng

頁碼/Pagination
pp. 433-469

摘要
裴爾士在1878年提出了一個跟「機率觀念」以及「個人在什麼條件下有正當性依據機率來進行推論」有關的難題，並且提出了「社會情操」(或稱「邏輯情操」) 來作為解答方案。雖然美國當代著名哲學家蒯因與帕特南都曾經評論與詮釋過這個難題以及裴爾士的解答方案，而且帕特南將此難題稱為「裴爾士難題」並給予相當的重視，但是他們的評論與詮釋都不夠清晰，也未盡忠實。筆者在本文中區分了「邏輯」與「合乎邏輯性」，將「邏輯情操」從「利他的道德關懷」及「個人利益」中區隔出來，並且直接根據裴爾士的機率觀念汲取出他所提出的這三個邏輯情操的內容；藉由這些做法，筆者得以給出一個更為可信與忠實的詮釋。

Abstract
In 1878, Peirce provided a puzzle concerning both his conception of probability and under what conditions one is permitted to reason in accordance with probability; he then offered social sentiment (or logical sentiment) as solution. Quine and Putnam, two well-known contemporary American philosophers, commented upon and interpreted “Peirce’s puzzle” and his proposed solution. However, their comments and interpretations are neither illuminating nor faithful, leaving Peirce’s thought obscure. In this paper, a more credible and faithful interpretation is suggested with the help of the distinction between logic and logicality, of the separation of logical sentiment from both altruistic moral concern and personal interest, and of the derivation of the contents of Peirce’s three logical sentiments from his conception of probability.

關鍵字/Key Word
裴爾士、帕特南、邏輯、情操、機率
Charles S. Peirce, Hilary Putnam, logic, sentiment, probability

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DOI
https://doi.org/10.7015/JEAS.201712_47(4).0002

學門分類/Subject
哲學 Philosophy