出刊年月/Date of Publishing

2019.12

所屬卷期/Vol. & No.   第49卷第4期 Vol. 49, No. 4

類型/Type                 研究論文 Research Article

篇名/Title
論 Gettier 式思想實驗的兩難
On a Dilemma of the Gettier-Style Thought Experiments

作者/Author
李國揚 Kok Yong Lee

頁碼/Pagination
pp. 485-521

摘要
Gettier式思想實驗是當代知識理論討論的標準論證工具之一。根據主流的典型論證策略，Gettier式思想實驗既被用來作為反對知識理論的反例，也被用來作為支持知識理論的證成者。本文將指出，Gettier式思想實驗這兩個理論角色的要求是有內在衝突的，而這將導致一個兩難的處境。

Abstract
Gettier-style thought experiments have become a standard methodology in modern epistemology. Not only are the Gettier-style thought experiments frequently used as counterexamples to an account of knowledge, they are also commonly taken to be justifiers of an account of knowledge. This paper argues that there is a tension between these two argumentative roles of the Gettier-style thought experiments, which gives rise to a dilemma.

關鍵字/Key Word
思想實驗、必然論、反例、證成者、特異情境問題
thought experiment, necessitism, counterexample, justifier, the problem of deviant realization

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DOI
https://doi.org/10.7015/JEAS.201912_49(4).0003

學門分類/Subject
哲學 Philosophy