出刊年月/Date of Publishing
2021.12
所屬卷期/Vol. & No. 第51卷第4期 Vol. 51, No. 4
類型/Type 研究論文 Research Article
出刊年月/Date of Publishing
2021.12
所屬卷期/Vol. & No. 第51卷第4期 Vol. 51, No. 4
類型/Type 研究論文 Research Article
篇名/Title
如何指認一個生命個體:以實作個體化為基礎的客觀多元主義
How to Identify a Biological Individual: Objective Pluralism Based on Practical Individuation
作者/Author
陳瑞麟 Ruey-Lin Chen
頁碼/Pagination
pp. 721-768
摘要
什麼是一個生命個體?如何指認它?這個生命個體性問題是近來歐美生物學哲學的熱門議題。有許多不同的理論、觀點、定義和判準被提出來,因此也形成了不同的「生命個體性」概念,如「演化個體性」與「生理個體性」。有些哲學家企圖尋求統一的架構,有些哲學家則接受多元主義。本文討論「生命個體性」現存的多元定義和判準,並論證多元主義的結論是不可避免的:我們確實無法找出一個統一或整合的架構來覆蓋整個複雜多樣的生命世界。可是,本文不支持實用主義或相對主義,反而論證我們可以在實作個體化的基礎上來建立客觀的多元主義。
Abstract
What is a biological individual and how do we identify such? The problem of biological individuality recently became a hot issue in the philosophy of biology in Europe and North America. Philosophers of biology propose many theories, views, definitions, or criteria for “biological individuality,” and these views or criteria imply different conceptions such as “evolutionary individuality” and “physiological individuality.” To resolve the predicament, some philosophers attempt to erect a unified framework, while others accept pluralism. This paper discusses current plural criteria and conceptions and argues for the inevitability of pluralism. However, instead of falling into relativism or adopting pragmatism, the paper argues that we can justify an objective pluralism on the basis of practical individuation.
關鍵字/Key Word
生物學哲學、科學形上學、個體化、多元主義、科學實作
philosophy of biology, metaphysics of science, individu-ation, pluralism, scientific practice
DOI
https://doi.org/10.7015/JEAS.202112_51(4).0003
學門分類/Subject
哲學 Philosophy